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We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium econ-
omy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to
borrow in future periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple con-
dition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide
an equivalence result, whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self-enforcing
private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or
rational bubbles; for the latter, there exist well known existence and characterization results.
In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoﬀ (AER 1989), positive levels of debt are
sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is suﬃciently low to provide repayment
incentives.
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In a seminal paper, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989a – henceforth BR) question the sustainability of
debt purely by reputational considerations. Consider a small open economy that borrows at a
given positive world interest rate, and suppose that the only consequence of default is that the
country is denied credit in all future periods. BR show that if the country ever borrows a positive
amount, there will eventually come a time at which it is better oﬀ defaulting and ﬁnancing all future
consumption with positive asset positions. This result has widely been interpreted as stating that
the denial of future credit alone is insuﬃcient to provide repayment incentives. A large literature
has then considered alternative explanations for positive levels of debt and international capital
ﬂows, for example reductions in trade ﬂows, loss of trade credit, explicit non-ﬁnancial sanctions,
collusion among non-competitive lenders, loss of reputation in other dimensions, reduced access
to state-contingent securities, outright market exclusion, or time inconsistency in the borrower’s
preferences that prevent eﬃcient savings schemes.1
An important ingredient in BR’s argument is that the borrower is able to save at market
interest rates after a default.2 When the borrower decides to default he can enter a “cash in
advance” contract with some other agent (some other country or international ﬁnancial institution),
by paying upfront in exchange for future state-contingent payments. This other agent therefore
basically turns into a borrower, since he accepts a payment today in exchange for future payments.
But what guarantees that this agent will fulﬁll his future obligations? In BR, this question does
not arise, since the latter agent is assumed to have commitment power for exogenous reasons. The
issue, however, seems especially relevant in the context of international capital markets, in which all
participating countries have the option to default on their outstanding debt, if it is in their interest
to do so. In such an environment, one country’s ability to save after a default, and therefore its
default incentives, also rests on the other countries’ repayment incentives.
In this paper, we reconsider the incentives for debt repayment in an environment with multi-
lateral lack of commitment, in which no agent can credibly commit to repay their obligations. As
1A non-exhaustive list of contributions includes Amador (2003), Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989b), Cole and Kehoe (1995,
1998), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Gul and Pesendorfer (2004), and Kletzer and Wright (2000).
2Similar results apply to government debt in a model with distortive taxes and lack of government commitment
(Chari and Kehoe, 1993) and to competitive insurance markets with one-sided commitment by insurers, but not
households (Kruger and Uhlig, 2006). These papers share with BR the assumption of one-sided commitment, and
the loss of access to credit (but not savings) after a default. Krueger and Uhlig (2005) further discuss how the
latter naturally emerges from competition by insurers with one-sided commitment. As a consequence, the only
implementable contracts require the uncommitted agents to smooth consumption by lending to the committed agents.
1in BR, we suppose that the only consequence of default is the denial of credit in all future periods.
Following Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000), we formulate our model as a
competitive equilibrium with endogenous debt limits, in which interest rates and debt limits adjust
endogenously to regulate the incentives to repay outstanding debt.
In contrast to what happens in BR, we show that under some conditions positive levels of
debt are sustainable in an environment with multilateral lack of commitment.3 In the process,
we identify an unexpected connection between the sustainability of debt by reputation and the
sustainability of rational asset pricing bubbles (Tirole 1982).
The key to our result is that equilibrium interest rates adjust to ensure that agents repay their
debt. We ﬁrst show that the incentive to default disappears if interest rates are suﬃcient low.
Reputational incentives for debt repayment thus rely not only on the amount of credit to which
agents have access in future periods, but, perhaps more importantly, on the interest rate at which
this credit is made available. We then go on to show that interest rates low enough to be consistent
with repayment can emerge in equilibrium in an economy where no agent can commit to repay.
To illustrate these results, we ﬁrst present a simple example where, in equilibrium, positive
borrowing is sustained and the interest rate is equal to zero. More generally, debt is self-enforcing,
as long as the real interest rate is less than or equal to the growth rate of debt limits, which equals
the growth rate of aggregate endowments in steady-state.
In the rest of the paper, we give a full characterization of the conditions under which private
debt is sustainable. We consider a stochastic endowment economy with sequential trade in complete
contingent securities markets. Agents may issue securities up to a state-contingent limit. If they
default, they are denied credit in all future periods. The equilibrium debt limits are determined
endogenously as the largest possible limits such that repayment is always individually rational. Our
ﬁrst general result (Theorem 1) states that debt limits are self-enforcing if and only if they allow
all individuals to exactly re-ﬁnance outstanding obligations by issuing new claims.
We then establish conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with self-enforcing debt and
give a characterization of sustainable equilibrium allocations by means of an equivalence result.
Consider an alternative environment with no private debt, but where a government issues state-
contingent debt that is not backed by any ﬁscal revenue, i.e., where the government must ﬁnance
3The idea that intertemporal trade is sustainable when all agents have limited commitment also appears in Cole
and Kehoe (1995), Kocherlakota (1995), and in Kletzer and Wright (2000), among others. However, these papers
suppose that all ﬁnancial transactions are observable, and debt is sustained using a Folk Theorem logic, with strategies
that implement autarky as an optimal punishment after a default. Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) show that the corresponding equilibrium allocations can be decentralized through competitive debt markets.
2all existing claims by issuing new debt. This unbacked public debt has the feature of a rational
bubble; in a deterministic environment, it can be reinterpreted as ﬁat money. Theorem 2 shows that
any equilibrium allocation of the economy with self-enforcing private debt can also be sustained as
an equilibrium allocation of the economy with unbacked public debt, and vice versa. Since there
exist well known conditions for the sustainability of positive levels of unbacked public debt, or,
more generally, for the existence of rational bubbles (see Santos and Woodford 1997 for a general
analysis), these conditions also characterize the sustainability of positive levels of private debt in
a general equilibrium BR economy. In particular, the same condition of “high vs. low equilibrium
interest rates” determines the sustainability of both self-enforcing private debt and rational asset
pricing bubbles. Positive levels of debt require low equilibrium interest rates, or more precisely,
equilibrium state prices such that endowments are inﬁnite-valued. In contrast, BR assume that the
net present value of a borrower’s life-time endowments is ﬁnite. This assumption exactly rules out
the debt contracts and state-prices that emerge in general equilibrium.
The possibility of rational bubbles in models with borrowing constraints àl aBewley (1980) has
been recognized in Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kocherlakota (1992) and Santos and Woodford
(1997). Our equivalence result shows that self- e n f o r c i n gp r i v a t ed e b tp l a y st h es a m er o l ea sa
rational asset bubble, and that it can take its place in facilitating intertemporal exchange.
In Section 2, we describe our general model and deﬁne competitive equilibria with self-enforcing
private debt and unbacked public debt. In Section 3, we illustrate our main results in a simple
example. In Section 4, we study repayment incentives for individual agents, and characterize
self-enforcing debt limits (Theorem 1). In section 5, we study the resulting general equilibrium
implications (Theorem 2). Proofs omitted from the text are in the appendix; some of the more
technical proofs, and additional results can be found in an online appendix.
2 The Model
Uncertainty, preferences and endowments: Consider an inﬁnite-horizon endowment economy
with a single non-storable consumption good at each date t ∈ {0,1,2,...}.F o r e a c h t,t h e r ei sa
positive ﬁnite set St of date-t events st.E a c h st has a unique predecessor σ
¡
st¢
∈ St−1,a n da
positive, ﬁnite number of successors st+1 ∈ St+1,f o rw h i c hσ
¡
st+1¢
= st. There exists a unique
















the complete event tree.




, such that st−1 = σ
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for all t.A td a t et, st




















conditional probability of st+τ,g i v e nst.
There is a ﬁnite number J of consumer types, each represented by a unit measure of agents,
and indexed by j. Each consumer type is characterized by a sequence of endowments of the





















where β ∈ (0,1),a n du(·) is strictly increasing, concave, bounded, and twice diﬀerentiable.
Markets: At each date st, agents can issue and trade a complete set of contingent securities,
which promise to pay one unit of period t +1consumption, contingent on the realization of event
st+1 Â st, in exchange for current consumption. If no agent ever defaults (as will be the case in
equilibrium), securities issued by diﬀerent agents are perfect substitutes for each other, and trade
at a common price.
If agents had the ability to fully commit to their promises, they would be able to smooth all
type-speciﬁc endowment ﬂuctuations. In our model, agents cannot commit: at any date st,t h e y
can refuse to honor the securities they have issued and default. Any default becomes common
knowledge and the defaulting agent loses the ability to issue claims in all future periods. Creditors
can seize the ﬁnancial assets he holds at the moment of default (i.e., his holdings of claims issued
by other agents), but they are unable to seize any of his current or future endowments Y j ¡
st¢
,n o r
any of his future asset holdings. In sum, after a default, an agent loses the ability to issue debt,
starts with a net ﬁnancial position of 0, but he retains the ability to purchase assets.5
This form of punishment follows the assumptions of BR. It captures the idea that it is much
easier for market participants to coordinate on not accepting the claims issued by a given borrower,
than to enforce an outright ban from ﬁnancial markets. As the future denial of credit eliminates
the incentive to repay, a potential lender will assign zero value to the claims issued by a borrower




denotes the realization of x at event s

















5The assumption that any positive holdings of other agents’ claims are conﬁscated in case of default implies that
agents can default only on their net ﬁnancial position. This assumption is made only for analytic and expositional
purposes, and we will discuss later how it can be relaxed without changing our results. Therefore, the only disciplining
e l e m e n tt h a tm a yp r e v e n ta g e n t sf r o md e f a u l t i n gi sl o s i n gt h ep r i v i l e g et ob o r r o wi nf u t u r ep e r i o d s .
4who has defaulted in the past. Enforcing an outright ban from ﬁnancial markets, on the other
hand, requires that potential borrowers are dissuaded from accepting loans at market prices from
agents who have defaulted in the past. The denial of future credit thus only requires the issuer of
each security to be known, while a ban from ﬁnancial markets requires that the identity of buyers
and sellers in all ﬁnancial transactions are observable, so that agents can be punished for dealing








price of consumption at st, p
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st¢











for all st ∈ S.
Let aj ¡
st¢
denote the agent’s net ﬁnancial position at st, that is, the amount of st-contingent
securities he holds net of the amount of st-contingent securities he has issued. An agent chooses
























,f o re a c hst ∈ S.( 2 )
The amount of securities an agent issues is observable, and subject to a state-contingent upper
bound −φj ¡
st+1¢





, for all st+1 Â st,s t ∈ S. (3)
Given the initial asset position aj ¡
s0¢
, the optimal consumption and asset proﬁle for an agent
who never defaults maximizes (1), subject to the constraints (2) and (3).
Self-enforcing private debt: Since several arguments in the paper require the manipulation
of budget sets, it is convenient to denote by Cj(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st) the set of feasible consumption proﬁles
Cj ¡
st¢
for a type-j agent starting at event st with an asset position a ∈ R, and facing future debt
limits Φj ¡
st¢
















































Since V j(a,Φj ¡
st¢
;st) is increasing in a,i fφj ¡
st¢







5then for all a>φ j ¡
st¢
, not defaulting is strictly preferred to default, whereas for all a<φ j ¡
st¢
,
default is strictly preferred. This leads to the following deﬁnition.











for all st ∈ S. (6)
These debt limits imply that at each st, an agent is exactly indiﬀerent between default and no
default if his net ﬁnancial position equals φj ¡
st¢
. This is akin to Alvarez and Jermann’s (2000)
notion of debt limits being “not too tight,” and implies that debt limits adjust to allow for the
maximum amount of credit that is compatible with repayment incentives. In principle, any set of




;st) ≥ Dj ¡
0;st¢
for all st ∈ S eliminates default incentives.




;st) >D j ¡
0;st¢
, an agent facing a binding debt
limit at φj ¡
st¢
would be willing to borrow at a rate slightly higher than the market interest rate
and market participants would not be willing to refuse him credit. Our debt limits are thus set so
that (i) no borrower has an incentive to default, and (ii) no lender has an incentive to extend credit
beyond a borrower’s debt limit.
A competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt is then deﬁned as follows:








=0 , a competitive equilibrium with self-
enforcing private debt consists of consumption and asset proﬁles and debt limits {Cj,A j,Φj}j=1,...,J,
and state-contingent bond prices Q, such that (i) for each j, {Cj,A j} maximize (1), subject to (2)
and (3), for given aj ¡
s0¢












=0for all st ∈ S.
Our equilibrium deﬁnition exactly follows Alvarez and Jermann (2000), with the exception of
the default consequence, which allows only for denial of future credit, instead of complete autarky.
Conceptually, the debt limits are similar to prices in Walrasian markets, in that individuals opti-
mize taking prices and debt limits as given, but both are endogenously determined by the market
equilibrium to satisfy the market-clearing and self-enforcement conditions.
Unbacked public debt: For our equivalence result, we consider an alternative economy with
unbacked public securities. As before, there are sequential markets with complete contingent secu-
rities. However, unlike before, agents can no longer issue these claims. Claims are only supplied by
a government, which rolls over a ﬁxed initial stock of claims d
¡
s0¢
period by period by issuing new












6for all st ∈ S,i . e . a tst the amount of resources raised by issuing new claims for all st+1 Â st
must be suﬃcient to honor the previous period’s commitments. This budget constraint captures
the notion that these securities are not backed by any tax revenues or other government income.













for all st ∈ S.( 7 )
Given initial asset holdings aj ¡
s0¢
≥ 0, optimal consumption allocations and asset holdings
maximize (1), subject to (2) and the non-negativity constraint aj ¡
st¢
≥ 0 for all st ∈ S.A
competitive equilibrium with unbacked public debt is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 For given initial asset positions aj ¡
s0¢







, a competitive equilibrium with unbacked public debt consists of consumption and asset
proﬁles {Cj,A j}j=1,...,J, a debt supply proﬁle D, and bond prices Q, such that (i) for each j,
{Cj,A j} are optimal given aj ¡
s0¢















for all st ∈ S.
3E x a m p l e
In this section, we illustrate the main results of our paper by means of a simple example with two
types of consumers. In each period, one type receives the high endowment e and the other type
receives the low endowment e,w i t he+e =1 . The types switch endowment with probability α from
one period to the next. Formally, uncertainty is captured by the Markov process st,w i t hs t a t es p a c e
S = {s1,s2} and symmetric transition probabilities Pr[st+1 = s1|st = s2]=P r[ st+1 = s2|st = s1]=
α. The event st corresponds here to the sequence {s0,...,s t} and the endowments yj ¡
st¢
only
depend on the current realization of st,w i t hyj ¡
st¢
= e,i fst = sj and yj ¡
st¢
= e if st 6= sj.
We construct a symmetric Markov equilibrium, in which consumption allocations, asset hold-
ings, debt limits, and the prices of state-contingent bonds depend only on the current state st,
consumption allocations and asset holdings are symmetric across types and states, and the debt
limit is binding in the high-endowment state for each agent. To focus on a stationary equilibrium,
assume that the economy begins in state s0 = s1 and that the initial asset positions are a1 (s0)=−ω
and a2 (s0)=ω,w h e r e−ω is the debt limit for both agents. Proposition 1 shows that equilibria
with positive debt levels can exist.
7Proposition 1 Let c be the solution to 1 − β (1 − α)=βαu0 (1 − c)/u0 (c).6 If c<e,t h e r ee x i s t s
a stationary equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt in which:
(i) State-contingent bond prices are q
¡
st+1¢




qnc ≡ β (1 − α) if st+1 = st;
(ii) Consumption allocations are cj ¡
st¢
= c if st = sj and cj ¡
st¢
= c if st 6= sj,w h e r ec ≡ 1−c;
(iii) Asset holdings are aj ¡
st¢
= −ω if st = sj and aj ¡
st¢
= ω if st 6= sj,w h e r eω ≡
(e − c)/(2qc);
(iv) Debt limits are φj ¡
st¢
= −ω for all st ∈ S.
Conditional on no agent ever defaulting, it is straightforward to check that the proposed con-
sumption allocations and asset holdings are optimal, and asset markets clear. Therefore, we only
need to check the no-default condition (6). This condition follows as an immediate consequence
of our ﬁrst general result, Theorem 1 below, which states that a sequence of debt limits Φ is self-











for all st ∈ S. In our example, this
condition reduces to 1=qc + qnc,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed by our equilibrium prices.
Where does this characterization of self-enforcing debt limits come from, and why does it relate
the incentives for repayment to the bond prices? To clarify this point consider an agent who
contemplates the option of defaulting in a period where he receives the high endowment and is




=2 ω if st 6= sj,a n dˆ a
¡
st¢
=0if st = sj, carrying a higher asset position into low-endowment
states and a zero asset position into high-endowment states. The resulting consumption proﬁle
is ˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e − 2ωqc if st = sj,a n dˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e +2 ω − 2ωqnc if st 6= sj. In comparison, the
consumption proﬁle without default is, by construction, cj ¡
st¢
= c = e − 2ωqc if st = sj,a n d
cj ¡
st¢
=1− c = e +2 ωqc if st 6= sj. Therefore, whenever 1 − qnc >q c, a default leads to strictly
higher consumption in low-endowment periods and to the same consumption in high-endowment
periods hence default is strictly preferred to no-default.
A symmetric argument shows that if 1−qnc <q c, the agent strictly prefers no-default to default.




st 6= sj,a n dˆ a
¡
st¢
=0if st = sj,w h e r eˆ a is determined from the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition
in high endowment periods. The resulting consumption proﬁle is ˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e − ˆ aqc if st = sj and
ˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e +ˆ a(1 − qnc) if st 6= sj. If instead the agent does not default, he can set aj ¡
st¢
= −ω
if st = sj and aj ¡
st¢
=ˆ a − ω(1 − qnc)/qc > −ω if st 6= sj, where the last inequality follows from
6Inada conditions on u(.) are suﬃcient to ensure that there is a unique c ∈ (0,1) that solves this equation.
8ˆ a>0 and 1 − qnc <q c. The resulting consumption allocations are ˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e − ˆ aqc if st = sj and
ˆ cj ¡
st¢
= e +ˆ a(1 − qnc)+ω(qnc + qc − 1)/qc if st 6= sj. Thus, whenever 1 − qnc <q c, the agent
strictly prefers not to default. The condition qc+qnc =1is therefore required to ensure that agents
are exactly indiﬀerent between default and no-default.
Proposition 1 illustrates our ﬁrst general result: positive levels of debt are sustainable in equi-
librium if interest rates are suﬃciently low. Repayment incentives depend not only on how much
the agent is allowed to borrow in the future, but also on the interest rate at which borrowing and
lending will take place. The higher the interest rate, the less appealing is the opportunity to borrow
in the future, and the more appealing the option to be a net lender after default. In general equi-
librium the interest rate and the debt limits will jointly adjust to ensure that debt is self-enforcing
and markets clear. Notice that the resulting interest rate is so low that aggregate endowments are
inﬁnite-valued.
A stationary equilibrium with positive borrowing only exists when e>c.7 In addition, there
always exists an autarkic equilibrium with zero borrowing and prices equal to qaut
c = βαu0 (e)/u0 (e)
and qaut
nc = β (1 − α). Whether the inequality e>c holds is equivalent to whether the risk-free
interest rate in the autarkic equilibrium, 1/(qaut
c + qaut
nc ),i ss m a l l e rt h a n1. If it is larger than
1, aggregate endowments are ﬁnite-valued at the autarkic equilibrium, i.e., the autarky allocation
displays “high implied interest rates,” in the language of Alvarez and Jermann (2000). In this case,
autarky is the unique equilibrium. If instead 1/(qaut
c + qaut
nc ) is less than 1, aggregate endowments
are inﬁnite-valued in the autarkic equilibrium and there exist additional equilibria with positive
debt circulation.8
The condition that e>c also ensures that this economy admits a stationary equilibrium with
valued unbacked public debt, with consumption allocations and bond prices that are identical to
the ones in the equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt.
Proposition 2 If e>c, there exists an equilibrium with unbacked public debt, in which consump-
tion allocations and prices are the same as in Proposition 1, asset holdings are aj ¡
st¢
=0if st = sj
and aj ¡
st¢
=2 ω if st 6= sj, and the government’s supply of debt is d
¡
st¢
=2 ω for all st ∈ S.
7Whether or not ¯ e>¯ c d e p e n d so no nt h em o d e lp a r a m e t e r s ,a n di np a r ticular on the volatility and persistence of
the endowment process and on the agents’ risk aversion.
8These results lead to an interesting comparison with the autarky punishment considered in Alvarez and Jermann
(2000): in both cases, a non-autarkic equilibrium exists if and only if the autarky allocation displays “low implied
interest rates” (Proposition 4.8 in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) proves the necessity part in general), but when there
exist non-autarkic equilibria, the maximum sustainable level of debt in Alvarez and Jermann leads to high implied
interest rate, and is hence strictly higher than in our model with exclusion from credit.
9Proposition 2 illustrates our second general result: equilibrium allocations in an economy with
self-enforcing private debt are equivalent to equilibrium allocations in an economy with unbacked
public debt. This is proved in full generality in Theorem 2 and allows us to use equilibrium
characterizations that apply in known environments with unbacked public debt to establish the
existence and characterization of equilibria with positive levels of self-enforcing private debt.
In Appendix C, we extend the analysis of this example in several dimensions. First, we augment
the example to include aggregate endowment growth, showing that the equilibrium interest rate
must equal the economy’s growth rate, which must equal the growth rate of the aggregate debt
supply and the individual debt limits in steady-state. We also extend our results to non-stationary
equilibria, in which there is an expectations-driven, self-fulﬁlling collapse in the real value of debt
(equivalent to the hyper-inﬂations of the public debt/ﬁat money economy). Finally, we show how
the transition dynamics depend on type-speciﬁc debt limits and initial asset holdings.
4 Characterizing Repayment Incentives
In this section, we characterize the repayment incentives of an individual borrower. The main
result in this section (Theorem 1) is that debt limits are self-enforcing if and only if they “allow for




b yi s s u i n gn e wd e b t ,u pt ot h el i m i t−φ
¡
st+1¢
,f o re a c hst+1 Â st.S i n c e
we are exclusively concerned with the single-agent problem, we simplify notation throughout this
section by dropping the superscript j.













for all st ∈ S. (8)









;st) for all st ∈ S.
This theorem also shows that the budget set of an agent who faces self-enforcing debt limits Φ is
identical to that of an agent facing zero debt limits, but starting from a higher initial asset position.
Hence, optimal consumption and asset proﬁles are the same for the two agents. This simpliﬁes the
equilibrium characterization, since, rather than computing the ﬁxed point between the consumer’s
optimization problem and the self-enforcement condition (20), we only need to compute optimal
consumption allocations for agents with zero debt limits, and these are identical to the optimal
10consumption allocations without default. Equilibrium debt limits are then constructed in such a
way that they satisfy (20) and market clearing in the asset market.
Condition (20) states that debt can only be sustained, if, instead of repaying, the borrower is
able to inﬁnitely roll over outstanding debt. To see what this characterization of debt limits entails,
we can compare it to BR’s no lending result.





























< 0 for some




BR show that lending is not sustainable if two conditions hold: (i) endowments are ﬁnite-valued
at the prevailing state prices, i.e. interest rates are high, and (ii) the agent’s debt is bounded by
the present value of his future endowments, his “natural debt limit.” Condition (i) is imposed as
an exogenous restriction on state-prices. Condition (ii) on the other hand is a standard restriction
which is usually imposed to rule out Ponzi games.9 With high interest rates, Theorem 1 implies
that any self-enforcing debt limits have to eventually be inconsistent with the natural debt limits.
With low interest rates, however, natural debt limits are inﬁnite, and condition (ii) imposes no
restriction on debt levels.
To sustain positive debt levels, we must abandon one of these conditions. From a partial
equilibrium point of view, relaxing either one can lead to self-enforcing debt. However, a general
equilibrium argument shows that the interesting case arises when we dispose of condition (i).I fw e
relax condition (ii), but maintain high interest rates, Theorem 1 implies that, if there are positive
levels of debt, the aggregate stock of debt, and thus the savings of some lender, will eventually
exceed the value of aggregate endowments. This clearly cannot happen in general equilibrium. On
the other hand, it is possible to construct economies where, in general equilibrium, condition (i)
fails to hold, as shown in the example in Section 3 and, more generally, in Section 5 below.
Exact roll-over implies self-enforcement: The suﬃciency part of Theorem 1 is established
by the following proposition.














9In the working-paper version, Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1988, p. 5) hint at the idea that relaxing this condition may
lead to positive debt, when they remark that this assumption rules out “‘Ponzi’-type reputational contracts.”
11The self-enforcement condition (6) follows from setting a = φ
¡
st¢
in (9). Condition (9) further
implies that an agent who defaults on his maximum gross amount of debt −φ
¡
st¢
, but keeps his
own asset holdings a − φ
¡
st¢
after a default is always exactly indiﬀerent between defaulting and
not defaulting. The assumption that agents start with a net ﬁnancial position of zero after default
can therefore be relaxed without weakening repayment incentives.
We can illustrate the characterization of self-enforcing debt limits and the relation to the roll-
over condition with a series of ﬁgures. For this, we assume that endowment ﬂuctuations are de-
terministic, and agents trade a single uncontingent bond.10 The agents’ budget constraint can
then be rewritten as ct = yt +( ptat − pt+1at+1)/pt. For a given sequence of prices {pt},w ec a n
thus compare the consumption proﬁles resulting from diﬀerent asset plans simply by comparing
the period-by-period changes in the present value of asset holdings, ptat − pt+1at+1.I nt h ef o l l o w -
ing ﬁgures, we plot the time paths {ptat} of the present values of asset proﬁles with and without








Figure 1: Debt limits satisfying exact roll-over
Figure 1 considers repayment incentives when debt limits allow for exact roll-over. In a de-
terministic environment, this requires that ptφt is constant over time; such debt limits are plotted
by the dotted line A. Line B represents an arbitrary asset proﬁle that is feasible for an agent who
defaults at date t. Line C represents a parallel downwards shift of the asset proﬁle B, to an initial
asset position of φt. Notice that C generates the same consumption sequence as B. Moreover, since
proﬁle B remains non-negative, C always remains above A, and is therefore feasible for an agent
who starts with an asset position of φt and does not default. Hence, this agent must be weakly
better oﬀ not defaulting at date t. On the other hand, for any asset proﬁle C that is feasible without
default starting from an asset position of φt, there is some asset proﬁle B that is feasible starting
10We thus replace the dependence on s
t by a time subscript to simplify notation.
12from a default at date t, and gives the agent the same consumption proﬁle as C. If debt limits allow
for exact roll-over, the agent must therefore be exactly indiﬀerent between defaulting on an asset








Figure 2: Shrinking debt limits
Along similar lines, we can also illustrate how repayment incentives are violated, when the
present value of debt limits is shrinking over time. Figure 2 plots the case of BR, in which the
natural debt limits (line A) are ﬁnite and hence tightening over time, in present value, and they
act as a lower bound on the agent’s asset proﬁle. Then, for any asset proﬁle B that is consistent
with these debt limits and that admits positive debt at some date t, there exists a date t∗ ≥ t at
which the present value of the debt reaches a maximum. At that point, the agent can replicate the
same consumption proﬁle as B after a default, just using positive asset holdings (line C), or even
improve upon the no-default proﬁle by strictly increasing consumption at date t∗ (line D).
Likewise, if the present value of debt limits is expanding over time (Figure 3), for every proﬁle B










Figure 3: Expanding debt limits
13starting from asset position φt and implements the same consumption. Moreover, proﬁle D remains
feasible without default starting from asset position φt, but delivers strictly higher consumption at
date t∗, where the debt limits are expanding. Hence, agents strictly prefer not to default, when the
present value of debt limits is expanding over time.
Self-enforcement implies exact roll-over: Proposition 5 completes the proof of Theorem
1 by showing that debt limits are self-enforcing only if they allow for exact roll-over. This was
already suggested by the graphical arguments in Figure 2 and 3. However, this graphical intuition
is incomplete, since it only applies to sequences of debt limits whose present values are monotone
increasing or decreasing. Ruling out the possibility that arbitrary non-monotone sequences of debt
limits may be self-enforcing turns out to be considerably more involved.
Proposition 5 Any sequence of self-enforcing debt limits Φ allows for exact roll-over.
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix B, here we sketch the key steps. Consider a
sequence of self-enforcing debt limits Φ. Starting from some arbitrary event st,w eﬁrst construct
a sequence of auxiliary debt limits ˜ Φ
¡
st¢







































.T h e ﬁrst step of the proof (and the major technical hurdle) consists in
showing that this sequence is well-deﬁned and ﬁnite-valued. This is complicated by the fact that
present discounted values need not be well-deﬁned in our environment since we cannot rely on an
assumption of high interest rates or ﬁnite-valued endowments. The characterization in turn makes
use of the time-separability, concavity and boundedness of u(·).































.T h eﬁrst property states that ˜ Φ is a lower bound of Φ, and is equal to Φ whenever
the actual debt limit is binding. The second property states that ˜ Φ satisﬁes (ER) with a weak
inequality, so that under ˜ Φ, at any event, the maximum outstanding debt obligations are weakly
less than the funds that can be raised by exhausting debt limits on the continuation events.
Property (i), together with the concavity of u(·) then implies that the value of the no-default










, as under the auxiliary debt limits, ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
(since the latter only relaxes non-














































































for some st+τ ∈ S
¡
st¢
. Therefore, both inequal-




















, for all st+1 Â st. Repeating the




with optimal asset holdings ˆ A
¡
st+1¢










. Moreover, due to concavity and additive separability of U, optimal asset





































, which completes our proof.
Remark: Proposition 5 is the only result where we use the assumptions of additive time-
separability, concavity and boundedness of u(·). All other results rely purely on arbitrage ar-
guments and therefore require only strict monotonicity. The boundedness assumption is a strong
restriction, but it is required only for a partial equilibrium characterization. If one restricts atten-
tion to debt limits Φ such that optimal consumption allocations are bounded above by aggregate
endowments (a condition that must hold in general equilibrium), Proposition 5 holds under the
following weaker restriction.

























This regularity condition bounds the rate at which individual and aggregate endowments can
grow or decline, relative to the discount factor β. When relative risk aversion is bounded, this








5 General Equilibrium Characterization
We now turn to the question whether there exist equilibria with positive levels of self-enforcing
debt, and how they can be characterized. Theorem 2 shows that a given consumption allocation
15and price vector constitute a competitive equilibrium with self-enforcing private debt, if and only
if the same allocation and prices are an equilibrium of the corresponding economy with unbacked
public debt. For the latter economy, there are known existence and characterization results (e.g.
Santos and Woodford 1997), which then extend immediately to the economy with self-enforcing
private debt.
Theorem 2 An allocation {Cj}j=1,...,J and prices Q are sustainable as a competitive equilibrium
with self-enforcing private debt, if and only if {Cj}j=1,...,J and Q are also sustainable as a compet-
itive equilibrium with unbacked public debt.
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on three observations: First, as a consequence of Theorem 1, if
debt limits Φj are self-enforcing, then for suitably chosen initial asset positions, the feasible, and
hence the optimal, consumption allocations in the default and no-default problems are identical.








satisﬁes the government roll-over constraint (7). Likewise, for any debt
supply sequence D that satisﬁes (7), it is possible to construct sequences of debt limits Φj for each








. Finally, market-clearing conditions in the two environments are
equivalent. For goods markets, this is immediate; for asset markets this follows from the fact that
the above mapping between private debt limits and government debt supply generates the same
aggregate amount of debt circulation.
Theorem 2 formally establishes the connection between sustaining repayment incentives for
private debt and sustaining rational bubbles. In the private debt economy, the agents’ commitment
and enforcement power is so limited that any contract that, at some date, requires a positive transfer
of resources in net present value is not sustainable. Likewise, in the economy with unbacked public
debt, the government does not have the power to use taxation to guarantee its debtholders a positive
net transfer of resources. Existing debt must instead be rolled over indeﬁnitely. In both cases, the
result is that the only sustainable allocations roll over existing debt forever. The equivalence arises
because neither side can credibly commit to future transfers, either via contract enforcement or via
taxation.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have studied a general equilibrium economy with self-enforcing private debt, in
which, after a default, borrowers are excluded from future credit, but retain the ability to save
16in the market. For a partial equilibrium version of this model, in which a small open economy
borrows internationally at ﬁxed, positive interest rates, BR show that debt cannot be sustainable
by reputational mechanisms only: eventually, the country always has an incentive to default. The
BR result can be interpreted as follows: if there are some agents who are able to commit to
intertemporal transfers at “high interest rates,” then the remaining agents, who are unable to
commit, will accumulate and decumulate the securities issued by the committed agents, but will
never become net borrowers. Kruger and Uhlig (2006) provide the analytical foundations for this
interpretation.
In contrast, we show that positive levels of debt can be sustained when no party has commitment
power. The key to our result is that interest rates adjust downwards to provide repayment incentives
to all the potential borrowing parties. As a result, “low interest rates” emerge in equilibrium.
The assumption of multilateral lack of commitment seems especially appropriate for international
ﬁnancial markets, where it is reasonable to assume that sovereign nations will act in a self-interested
manner when evaluating whether to repay or default on their international obligations, and whether
to enforce the international obligations of their residents.
Our theoretical results help to clarify the BR result in two directions. From a formal point
of view, they highlight the role played by the interest rates in the BR argument. From a more
substantive point of view, they clarify the role of unilateral vs. multilateral lack of commitment
for the sustainability of debt in general equilibrium, and provide a characterization of the degree of
insurance which can be achieved when the punishment for default is only credit exclusion, showing
in particular that the sustainable levels of debt need not be zero. This analysis helps bridge the
gap between the negative result of BR and the positive results obtained with stronger forms of
punishment, in particular those in Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000).11
Our analysis leads to the question whether the debt dynamics of international borrowers dis-
play the self-ﬁnancing features identiﬁed in this paper, that is, whether borrowing countries face
conditions that enable them to roll over their debt indeﬁnitely. In practice, this amounts to testing
for rational bubbles in international debt, a quantitative issue whose resolution is outside the scope
of this paper. In closed economies, the sustainability of rational bubbles has been questioned both
on theoretical and on empirical grounds (e.g. Abel et al. 1989).12 However, some authors have
11See footnote 8. Our analysis also relates to the model of private international capital ﬂows of Jeske (2006) and
Wright (2006). In their model, the ability of agents to participate in domestic capital markets after defaulting on
external debt has the same eﬀects as the ability to save in our model. See the discussion in Wright (2006) for formal
details.
12In theory, rational bubbles are commonly ruled out by the presence of assets that pay an inﬁnite stream of
17recently argued that rational bubbles may be present in international ﬁnancial ﬂows (e.g. Ventura
2004, and Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2006). In this respect our theoretical results point out the
connection between the sustainability of rational bubbles and the problem of providing incentives
for repayment in a world with multilateral lack of commitment. Much work remains to be done to
incorporate this insight in a realistic model of international capital ﬂows and to test it empirically.
Finally, our paper also has implications for thel i t e r a t u r eo ni n s i d ea n do u t s i d em o n e y . I n
particular, in our setup unbacked public debt and self-enforcing private debt are analogous to
outside (ﬁat) money and inside money. The existing monetary literature discusses the circulation
of ﬁat money and inside money largely in separation from each other. The circulation of ﬁat
money requires that an intrinsically useless asset (a rational bubble) is traded at a positive price.
The circulation of inside money instead relies on having the proper reputational mechanisms in
place to guarantee that outstanding claims are honored. Although on the surface these seem to be
conceptually distinct problems, our analysis shows that they are closely related.13
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7 Appendix A: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Given the prices qc and qnc,t h eﬁrst order conditions for consumer j
can be rewritten as qcu0 (c)=βαu0 (c), qnc = β (1 − α),a n dqcu0 (c) ≥ βαu0 (c). These conditions
20hold given our deﬁnition of c (for the last inequality we make use of the fact that the deﬁnition of c
implies u0 (c) <u 0 (c)). In addition, budget constraints and market-clearing conditions are satisﬁed
by construction, given our deﬁnition of ω. As explained in the text, Theorem 1 below also implies
that these debt limits are self-enforcing.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is immediate to check that the proposed consumption allocations
and asset holdings are optimal for consumers, and they satisfy market-clearing in goods and asset
markets by construction. Moreover, since d
¡
st¢
is constant for all st ∈ S and qc + qnc =1 ,t h e
government’s roll-over condition is also satisﬁed.
























































































for all st ∈ S, and therefore
©
Φ(K)ª
is monotone increasing in K.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
©
Φ(K)ª
is bounded above by 0, this sequence
converges to a ﬁnite limit ˜ Φ which satisﬁes the above recursive construction.






for some st ∈ S, then the agent strictly prefers to default at



























































which is non-negative for all st+τ ∈ S
¡
st¢
, and strictly positive at st.
Finally, we show that if a
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st¢
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st¢
,w i t ha
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for all st+τ ∈ S
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st¢
, and therefore, starting from a
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starting from ˆ a
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st¢
= a − φj ¡
st¢




















P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . Step 1: Let {Cj,A j,Φ
j
,Q}j=1,...,J be a CE with self-enforcing pri-
vate debt, starting from initial asset positions {aj ¡
s0¢
}j=1,...,J.F o r e a c h j, consider the mod-
iﬁed asset proﬁles ˆ Aj = Aj − Φ
j




.B y p r o p o -









, which implies that {Cj, ˆ Aj} are optimal,






, and zero debt limits. Since Φj is self-










j=1 Aj =0 ,w eh a v e
PJ




= D. Hence {Cj, ˆ Aj,D,Q}j=1,...,J is a CE with unbacked public debt,
for initial asset positions {ˆ aj ¡
s0¢
}j=1,...,J.
Step 2: Let {Cj, ˆ Aj,D,Q}j=1,...,J be a CE with unbacked public debt, for initial asset positions
{ˆ aj ¡
s0¢





· D, and the asset proﬁle
˜ Aj = ˆ Aj + ˜ Φj, with initial asset holdings of ˜ aj ¡
s0¢
=0 . The debt limits ˜ Φj are self-enforcing by
construction, and using proposition 4, {Cj, ˜ Aj} are optimal, given inital asset position ˜ aj ¡
s0¢
=0
and debt limits ˜ Φj.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
PJ
j=1 ˆ Aj = D,w eh a v e
PJ
j=1 ˜ Aj = D +
PJ
j=1 ˜ Φj =0 ,s ot h a t
goods and asset markets clear. Therefore {Cj,˜ aj, ˜ Φj,p}j=1,...,J is a CE with self-enforcing private
debt, for initial asset positions of zero.
8 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of Proposition 5 proceeds in ﬁve steps, which are stated as separate lemmas. Lemma
1 establishes useful properties of the solution to the consumer problem (5). Starting from an
arbitrary date st ∈ S, Lemma 2 constructs a sequence of auxiliary debt limits ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
.L e m m a 3
then establishes that ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
satisﬁes the (ER) condition as a weak inequality, and bounds the actual
debt limits from below. Lemma 4 establishes that ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
satisﬁes the exact roll-over condition as an
equality, and shows that the auxiliary and actual debt limits coincide at the initial date st. Finally,













for all st ∈ S,a n dt h a tφ
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st¢
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be the optimal consumption





at history st. Suppose either that






for all st+τ ∈ S
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st¢
, and that Assumption 1
holds. Moreover, let N
¡
st¢
denote the subtree of events starting from st, for which the debt limits



















































































denotes the set of histories st+τ along which the debt limit was never binding between event
st and st+τ,a n dN
¡
st¢
the union of all such sets, including st. Bτ
¡
st¢
denotes the set of histories
st+τ at which the debt limit is binding for the ﬁr s tt i m ea f t e rst,a n dB
¡
st¢




deﬁnes the ‘subtree’ of N
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Lemma 1 establishes that optimal asset plans and consumption allocations are increasing in


































< ∞ and ˆ φ
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st+τ;st¢














Proof. Part (i):T h a tV is strictly increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable in a follows immediately
from the properties of the consumer problem (5). Since c
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st¢





































































are the Lagrange multipliers on, respectively, the budget constraint at st and the debt limit































































which has a unique solution λ
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a;st¢




are strictly decreasing in λ). Moreover λ
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·;st¢







are all non-decreasing in a. Applying the same argument recursively




Part (ii): Summing the agent’s budget constraint over st+τ+k ∈ N
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st+τ;st¢





























Since the ﬁrst-order condition holds with equality for all st+τ+k ∈ N
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,a l o n g
with Assumption 1. But then, it follows immediately that ˆ Y
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, the only feasible allocation
without default yields c
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for all st+1 Â st. This yields a life-














. If instead the
agent defaults and sets d
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Proof. Step 1 establishes the existence of such a solution for st+τ ∈ N
¡
st¢
, together with the limit
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all st+τ ∈ N
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st¢
, and therefore Φ(1) ≥ T Φ(0).B u t T is a monotone operator, and therefore,
©
Φ(K)ª
is a non-decreasing sequence. Moreover, since φ(K) ¡
st+τ¢






must converge to a ﬁnite limit ˜ Φ
¡
st¢
which satisﬁes (11). The limit property then follows



















































denote the subset of histories in S
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st¢
, at which the debt limit is binding for the k th time after
st.S i n c e A∗ ¡
st¢
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with asset position φ
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.S i n c est was chosen





as o l u t i o n˜ Φ
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;t h e yc a n
immediately be extended to S
¡
st¢
using the construction of the previous proof.












































































for all st+τ+k ∈ N
¡
st+τ;st¢
0 for all st+τ+k ∈ B
¡
st+τ;st¢ ,
which is feasible after a default. Whenever st+τ+k ∈ B
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st+τ;st¢
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the non-default proﬁle. Moreover, for st+τ+k ∈ N
¡
st+τ;st¢
, the diﬀerence in consumption between


















































where the inequality is strict at st+τ. Therefore, consumption is weakly higher after a default for
all st+τ+k ∈ N
¡
st+τ;st¢

















all st+τ+1 ∈ B
¡
st+τ;st¢
in (11) then implies (ER) for all st+τ ∈ N
¡
st¢
. Solving (11) forward and







Part (ii): Applying the same arbitrage argument as in part (i) at st+τ ∈ B
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st¢

















.M o r e o v e r ,












, for all st+τ+1 Â st+τ,
from which the result follows immediately.




















,a n d˜ Φ
¡
st¢
satisﬁes (ER) with equality.
Proof. Consider the consumer problem with borrowing constraints equal to ˜ Φ(st).S i n c et h eo b -
jective is strictly concave, φ(st+τ) ≥ ˜ φ(st+τ;st) for all st+τ ∈ S
¡
st¢
,a n dφ(st+τ) > ˜ φ(st+τ;st)
only if a∗(st+τ) >φ (st+τ), ˜ Φ(st) relaxes only non-binding constraints, and hence A∗(st) is also
optimal for the relaxed problem with borrowing constraints ˜ Φ(st),i m p l y i n gV (φ(st), ˜ Φ(st),s t)=
26V (φ(st),Φ(st),s t). Using the self-enforcement hypothesis and the monotonicity of V (a, ˜ Φ(st),s t)
in a and φ(st) ≥ ˜ φ(st;st),t h i si m p l i e sD
¡
0,s t¢
= V (φ(st),Φ(st),s t)=V (φ(st), ˜ Φ(st),s t) ≥
V (˜ φ(st;st), ˜ Φ(st),s t). On the other hand, since ˜ Φ(st) satisﬁes the exact roll-over property as a




where the inequality is strict whenever ˜ φ(st+τ;st) >
P
st+τ+1Âst+τ q(st+τ+1)˜ φ(st+τ+1;st) for some
st+τ ∈ S(st). Together these inequalities can hold only as equalities, which requires that φ(st)=
˜ φ(st;st),a n d˜ φ(st+τ;st)=
P
st+τ+1Âst+τ q(st+τ+1)˜ φ(st+τ+1;st) for all st+τ ∈ S(st).
To complete the proof that Φ
¡
st¢







for all st+1 ∈ S
¡
st¢
. Whenever st+1 ∈ B1
¡
st¢
, i.e. whenever the debt limit is binding
at st+1,t h i si st r u eb yc o n s t r u c t i o n . O u rﬁnal lemma shows that this is also true whenever the
debt limit is not binding.
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, i.e. debt limits must be
binding for an agent starting from st+1 with assets φ
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st+1¢
, whenever they are binding for an
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9 Appendix C: Extensions of the example of Section 3
In this appendix, we examine three extensions of the example in Section 3. First, we discuss how
initial debt limits and initial asset holdings determine the transition to a steady-state equilibrium.
Second, we show the existence of non-stationary equilibria, in which the real value of debt collapses
over time. These equilibria are the counter-part to the “hyper-inﬂation” equilibria that exist in
the environment with unbacked public debt. Finally, we illustrate how our characterization of self-
enforcing debt extends to environments with growth, showing that, with CRRA utility, a stationary
equilibrium of our model is characterized by a real interest rate that is equal to the aggregate growth
rate.
27Transitional dynamics. In the environment with unbacked public debt, it is well known
that the transition to steady-state is complete the ﬁr s tt i m et h es t a t es w i t c h e s .B e f o r et h e n ,t h e
consumption allocations of each type are determined by initial asset holdings. Here, we show that
the same result applies to the economy with self-enforcing private debt, except that consumption
allocations in the initial phase are determined by both the debt limits and the initial asset holdings
of each type.
We begin by showing that the steady-state allocation (c,c) of Proposition 1 in the main text
does not require debt limits to be identical for both types - instead, the same allocations and prices
are sustained by any debt limits
¡
−ω1,−ω2¢
, such that ω1+ω2 =2 ω. To see that the consumption
allocations (c,c) and steady-state state prices (qc,q nc) continue to characterize an equilibrium with
self-enforcing debt even when debt limits are asymmetric, consider asset holdings of aj ¡
st¢
= −ωj,
if st = sj,a n daj ¡
st¢
= ω−j,i fst 6= sj. These asset holdings clear the market, and yield cj ¡
st¢
=
e−ωj (1 − qnc)−ω−jqc = e−qc
¡
ωj + ω−j¢
= c if st = sj,a n dcj ¡
st¢
= e+ω−j (1 − qnc)+ωjqc = c,
if st 6= sj. Therefore, the steady-state allocations can be supported by a continuum of diﬀerent
debt limits. In the extreme case, where ω1 =0 ,t y p e1 never borrows, and type 2 never lends.
Now, suppose that the economy begins at date 0 in state s0 = s1, and initial asset holdings
are a1 (s0)=a = −a2 (s0),f o rs o m ev a l u eo fa, and steady-state debt limits are
¡
−ω1,−ω2¢
,w i t h
ω1 + ω2 =2 ω. We construct equilibria where the consumption allocation is constant and equal
to (co,c o), asset holdings are a1 ¡
st¢
= a = −a2 ¡
st¢
as long as st = s1, and it switches to the






respectively, the state-contingent prices and the debt limits of types 1 and 2 in the transitional
phase (also assumed to be constant during this phase). (co,c o) and (qo
c,qo
nc) satisfy the consumer’s
budget constraints and ﬁrst-order conditions:
co = e + a(1 − qo
nc) − qo








nc = β (1 − α).( 1 3 )
The initial debt limits
¡
ω1o,ω2o¢






1 − β (1 − α)
u0 (c)
u0 (co)
ωj.( 1 4 )
Substituting the condition for co into the one for qo




ω2 = e + a(1 − β (1 − α)) (15)
28Since the LHS of (15) is strictly increasing in co, (15) admits a unique solution, from which one can
solve for the other variables. We thus have the following characterization of equilibrium transition
paths.
Proposition 6 For given initial asset holdings a1 (s0)=a = −a2 (s0) and steady-state debt limits
¡
−ω1,−ω2¢





,a n d(co,c o) for the transitional phase prior to the ﬁrst time the state switches from
s1 to s2. This characterizes a competitive equilibrium, if and only if (12), (13), and (14) are




Proof. Conditions (12), (13), and (14), together with a ∈
£
−ω1o,ω2o¤
and co ≥ c are necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the characterization of a competitive equilibrium of the form that
we construct here; the requirement that a ∈
£
−ω1o,ω2o¤
implies that debt limits for both types
are satisﬁed during the transition phase, while co ≥ c implies that the type 2 agent’s ﬁrst-order
condition holds as an inequality, when the state changes.
To prove our result, we thus need to show that this last condition is redundant, i.e. that it
is always implied by the former. Using (15), one ﬁnds that co is an increasing function of initial
asset holdings a. Moreover, rearranging (15) in terms of qo
c,w eh a v eqo
cu0 ¡











from which it follows that qo
c = qc and co = c when a = −ω1o. It follows that for any a ≥− ω1o,
co ≥ c>c , so that the type 2 agent’s ﬁrst-order condition is satisﬁed. Finally, notice that when
a = ω2o, co = e - for any higher initial asset position of type 1 (and lower asset position of type 2),
type 2 would have a strict incentive to default, consume his autarky allocation for one period, and
then reenter the market purely as a lender.
Thus, the amount of consumption smoothing that is feasible during the transition phase is a
function of the debt limits allocated to each type, and the initial asset positions. In the special case
where type 1’s initial asset position is exactly at his debt limit, the economy starts out directly
in the steady-state equilibrium. On the other hand, if type 2’s initial asset position is at his debt
limit, only the autarky allocation is feasible during the transition phase, and risk sharing starts only
once there is a switch in states. For any intermediate conﬁguration, the extent of consumption-
smoothing in the transition depends on how far each type is from his debt limit - the further type
2 is from his limit, and the closer type 1 is to his, the more consumption smoothing is feasible.
Non-stationary equilibria. We begin by considering non-stationary equilibrium paths in the
example of Section 3 of the paper. Let K
¡
st¢
denote the number of times the state has switched

















nc if st+1 = st and k = K
¡
st¢
, consumption allocations are cj ¡
st¢
= ck if st = sj





= ck if st 6= sj and k = K
¡
st¢
, asset holdings are aj ¡
st¢
= −ωk if





= ωk if st 6= sj and k = K
¡
st¢
, and debt limits are φj ¡
st¢
= ωk
if k = K
¡
st¢
. That is, as in the stationary equilibrium, agents are constrained at low-endowment
histories, but the tightness of the constraint changes each time the state switches between s1 and
s2.





k=0, notice that the consumption allocations
and prices must satisfy the agents’ budget constraint and ﬁrst-order conditions at high-endowment
histories:
ck = e − ωk + qk
ncωk − qk+1
c ωk+1 (16)














nc = β (1 − α) (19)
In addition, the sequence of debt limits must satisfy the exact roll-over condition:
ωk = qk+1
c ωk+1 + qk
ncωk.( 2 0 )
Substituting (16)-(19) into (20), and then using (20), the dynamics of ωk are then characterized by
the following diﬀerence equation:
ωk+1βαu0
³
e +2( 1− β (1 − α))ωk+1
´
− (1 − β (1 − α))ωku0
³
e − 2(1− β (1 − α))ωk
´
=0 (21)
This diﬀerence equation has two stationary points at ω (the steady state value derived in
Proposition 1 in the paper), and the other at zero. Moreover, we can rearrange this diﬀerence
equation in the form ωk = F
¡
ωk+1¢
, where the function F is continuous and has the property
that if ωk+1 >ω ,t h e nF
¡
ωk+1¢
>ω k+1,a n di fωk+1 <ω ,t h e nF
¡
ωk+1¢
<ω k+1. This in turn
implies that for each ωk <ω , there exists ωk+1 <ω k for which ωk = F
¡
ωk+1¢
.14 We thus have the
following characterization of non-stationary equilibria:
14If F is invertible, then this is the unique equilibrium path starting from any equilibrium value of ω
0 ≤ ω.I fF
is not invertible, there may be other solutions to (21), some of which satisfy ω
k+1 ≥ ω
k.As u ﬃcient condition for
invertibility is −u
00 (c)c/u
0 (c) ≤ 1,f o rc ∈ (0,1).
30Proposition 7 For given ω0 ∈ (0,ω), there exists a decreasing sequence
©
ωkª∞
k=0 that is recursively
deﬁned by (21), and a non-stationary equilibrium of the economy in Section 3, where prices and
allocations are given by (16)-(19), for k =0 ,1,2,....
Proof. To complete the above argument, we just need to check the agents’ ﬁrst-order conditions for























≥ u0 (c)/u0 (c) > 1,f r o mw h i c h
the result follows immediately.
These non-stationary equilibria are characterized by a self-fulﬁlling collapse of the value of
debt: agents anticipate that debt limits will tighten in the future, which limits the incentives for
repayment, and hence tightens current debt limits. These equilibria correspond to the ‘hyper-
inﬂationary’ equilibria of the economy with unbacked public debt, in which the real value of public
debt gradually collapses.
Growing endowments. Consider a variation on the economy of Section 3, where the two types
still receive randomly alternating endowments but the aggregate endowments are stochastically
growing over time. Uncertainty is represented by the Markov process ht = st × zt ∈ S × Z,w h e r e
S = {s1,s2} determines the share of aggregate endowments going to each type, and Z = {z1,...,z N}
determines the growth rate of aggregate endowments. Endowments yj ¡
ht¢












if st 6= sj,
with e + e =1 , and aggregate endowments characterized recursively by f
¡
zt¢




Transition probabilities are deﬁned by π (ht+1|ht)=P r [ st+1|st] · Pr[zt]; that is, aggregate and
distributional shocks are independent of each other, and the growth rate of aggregate endowments
is i.i.d. over time. The distributional shocks are characterized as before by symmetric transition
probabilities Pr[st+1 = s1|st = s2]=P r[ st+1 = s2|st = s1]=α.A g e n t sh a v eC R R Au t i l i t y ,u(c)=
c1−σ/(1 − σ). We further assume that β
P
z0 Pr[z0]g (z0)
1−σ < 1, so that life-time expected utilities
are ﬁnite.
We solve this extension of our model for a stationary equilibrium, in which state-prices, and
consumption allocations, asset holdings and debt limits (normalized by aggregate endowments) are
functions only of the current state ht. Following the same steps as Alvarez and Jermann, we can
re-cast this extension as an economy with constant endowments. In particular, consider an economy




















































Then, it is straight-forward to check that ( ˆ C, ˆ A) solve the consumer’s problem with the modiﬁed
allocations and probabilities, if and only if (C,A) solved the original consumer problem. Moreover,
these allocations clear the markets if and only if the original allocations do, and given ˆ Q, ˆ Φ satisﬁes
(ER) if and only if Φ satisﬁes (ER) given state-prices Q. The version of our model with i.i.d. shocks
to aggregate endowment growth thus maps exactly into the example considered in the paper. The
characterization of Proposition 1 (in the paper) then applies to the normalized quantities and prices
of the economy with growth.
















,a n dq(h0|h)=qcˆ π (z0)/g (z0) if s0 6= s,a n dq(h0|h)=
qncˆ π (z0)/g (z0) if s0 = s,w h e r ec, c, ω, qc,a n dqnc are deﬁned as in the paper, for a discount
rate ˆ β. In particular, this implies that the state-prices divided by endowment growth must add
up to 1,o rt h a t(
P
z0 ˆ π(z0)/g(z0))
−1 =1 , i.e. that the risk-free real interest rate is given by the
harmonic mean of the real growth rate. Thus, in equilibrium (as in the paper), the requirement
that debt limits be self-enforcing ties down the risk-free real interest rate at a level that is close to
the expected level of the aggregate growth rate.
15In this economy, z
t has no eﬀects on aggregate endowments, so it will not aﬀect real allocations - however, agents
still trade in securities that are contingent on z
t. If one extends the analysis to arbitrary one-stage Markov processes
for aggregate endowment growth. the same type of normalization leads to state-dependent discount rates (unless
σ =1 ), but this has little eﬀect on the economic implications of the model.
32